The Anglo-American double-member districts employing plurality-at-large are frequently criticized for giving a large majority premium to a winning party. In this paper, we demonstrate that the premium stems from a limited degree of voters' discrimination associated with only two positive votes on the ballot. To enhance voters' ability to discriminate, we consider rules that give voters more positive and negative votes. We identify voting equilibria of alternative scoring rules in a situation where candidates differ in binary ideology and binary quality; strategic voters are of two ideology types; and a candidate's ideology is more salient than quality. The most generous rules such as approval voting and combined approvaldisapproval voting only replicate the outcomes of plurality-at-large. The highest minority representation and the highest quality is achieved by a rule that assigns two positive votes and one negative vote to each voter.
Introduction
In the year 2012, a Czech financier, mathematician and philanthropist Karel Janeček proposed a '2+1 electoral rule'. 1 This scoring electoral rule for double-member districts gives each voter two positive votes and a single negative vote, where the positive and negative points add up to each other. A voter cannot cumulate positive points to a single candidate, but partial abstention is allowed. A unique feature of the 2+1 electoral rule is the simultaneous presence of the positive and negative votes; hence, the rule blends structurally different properties of best-rewarding and worst-punishing electoral rules (see Myerson, 1999) . Motivation for the rule is to allow voters to express their policy preferences safely but at the same time motivate them for discrimination along the quality (i.e., competence or integrity) dimension.
This paper attempts to compare the properties of the 2+1 rule relative to the properties of closely similar rules in two-member districts, including plurality-at-large that is currently almost exclusively used in Anglo-American double-member districts. Evidence from U.S. states demonstrates that plurality-at-large in two-member districts is associated with a low incidence of split outcomes (Cox, 1984) . In fact, in the 2010-2012 elections in U.S. states, a single party gained both seats in 78.5% of two-member districts. The large premium for a majority party in a district is seen as the major disadvantage of having two-member districts as such, and district magnitude has even become a constitutional issue in the United States. In a famous 1986 decision, Thornburg v. Gingles, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned North Carolina's multi-member legislative lines on the grounds they discriminated against blacks. The U.S. Voting Rights Act thus encourages the creation of districts where racial or ethnic minorities predominate, and single-member districts are interpreted as best fitting this objective.
Our analysis of plurality-at-large reveals that disproportionality in two-member districts is the result of an excessively large correlation of scores of candidates coming from a single party. The correlation can be weakened by reforming the structure of the ballot towards endowing voters with more than just two positive votes. We demonstrate that the resulting outcomes improve not only representativeness, but also the quality of the elected representatives. For that purpose, we investigate several scoring rules for two-member districts including plurality-at-large, the 2+1 rule, approval voting, and the most generous rule known as combined approval-disapproval voting (Felsenthal, 1989) . The rules differ in the maximal number of positive votes (V + = 0, 1, 2, 3) and the maximal number of negative votes (V − = 0, 1, 2, 3).
We confine the analysis to an elementary electoral situation with exactly one valence dimension and one policy dimension, which contains the essential tradeoff between policy (private The intuition over the beneficial effect of extra positive votes and the detrimental effect of extra negative votes does not translate into two-member districts. We begin with a symmetric binomial setting. Under plurality-at-large, voters support their two ideological candidates independently on their qualities. As a result, the dominant voting group always elects their two candidates independently on quality. Approval voting does not change the equilibrium. Endowing the voter with an arbitrary number of both positive and negative votes as in combined approval-disapproval voting (CAV) does not help either because strategic voters tend to avoid ballots with zero points (Felsenthal, 1989; Núñez and Laslier, 2013) .
Adding only a single negative vote (the 2+1 rule) now generates the following incentives: Each group of voters tries to win the two seats for their two candidates. In the electoral competition, two types of pivotal events arise: (i) If the group is in ex post majority (majority event), the stronger candidate of the group gains the first seat, and the weaker candidate of the group competes with the stronger candidate of the opposing group for the second seat. (ii) If the group is in ex post minority (minority event), the group cannot win the first seat, and its stronger candidate competes with the weaker candidate of the other group for the second seat. Since positive votes cannot accumulate to a single candidate, voters cast two positive votes for two candidates from their group to win both pivotal events. Quality then matters only for how the single negative vote is allocated.
The negative vote is cast to a low-quality candidate if the minority event turns out to be more valuable under a sincere profile. In the binomial setting, this case occurs for a large set of parameters. Intuitively, unless the probabilities of the majority and minority events differ too much from each other, only nominal win gains in the events matter. In the minority event, a nominal win gain is large because a win improves both policy and quality, whereas in the majority event, a nominal win is small because a win improves policy only at the expense of the lower quality of the elected candidate.
We compare the electoral outcomes achieved by plurality-at-large, approval voting, and combined approval-disapproval with the outcomes under the 2+1 rule in terms of quality and minority representation. The 2+1 rule increases the average quality of the elected candidates. By frequently generating split outcomes, it also protects minority interests more than the alternative rules in two-member districts. We additionally adopt a utilitarian welfare criterion to demonstrate that if the common valuation of quality is sufficiently large, utilitarian welfare unambiguously increases with the 2+1 rule.
To analyze the voters' incentives robustly, we adopt asymmetric large Poisson games. For the 2+1 rule, even under asymmetry, the ex-ante minority voters use the negative vote sincerely. The ex-ante majority voters strategically mix their negative votes to keep both opposing candidates equally serious. For the other electoral rules, pure ideology competition is the equilibrium for any parameters. Thus, we have again mixed electoral outcomes on the one side and non-mixed electoral outcomes on the other. Their comparison remains qualitatively similar to the binomial setting.
This paper adds to the very narrow literature on the simultaneous use of positive and negative votes that has to date been limited to the analysis of CAV. Second, similarly to runoff-voting analysis in Bouton (2013) , the attention of strategic voting theory with population uncertainty is here devoted to the analysis of rules in multi-prize elections, not in single-member elections (Myerson, 2002; Myatt, 2007; Núñez, 2010 ; Krishna and Morgan, 2011; Bouton and Castanheira, 2012). The main difference is decisive races in multi-member districts are contests for the last seat not for the first seat; thus, pivotal events have a more complicated structure than in single-member districts. Most importantly, the seriousness of a candidate is not monotonic in her expected score. Third, the paper is novel in the comprehensive analysis of strategic voting equilibria for a set of four candidates and multiple electoral rules, and in the simultaneous analysis of the two most widely used population uncertainty models. 4 Most of the recent literature examines a single rule and only three candidates (e.g., , and adding any extra candidate increases exponentially the size of the strategy set.
The general lesson of the paper is that adding negative votes on the ballot is valuable for reflecting preferences down the ranking, but the voters must be motivated to submit a ballot with a rich structure that uses negative votes as a second-order degree of discrimination. To generate two degrees of discrimination by the equilibrium ballot, the number of positive votes V + and the number of negative votes V − must be limited. Only this limit forces the voter to use the intermediate values (in our case, zero points). At the same time, too many levels of discrimination such as in Borda Count should be discouraged simply to avoid the strategic complexity in voting. The 2+1 rule is instrumental in capping the total number of votes (V + +V − < #K) and in limiting the structure of the votes (V − < V + ).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 motivates the electoral situation, electoral rules, and electoral behavior. Section 3 builds the symmetric binomial game. It analyzes three electoral rules for single-seat districts (plurality, mixed voting, and approval voting) and four electoral rules for two-seat districts (plurality-at-large, the 2+1 rule, approval voting, and combined approval-disapproval voting). Section 4 solves the equilibria for two-seat districts in a large asymmetric Poisson game. Section 5 concludes.
Electoral rules in two-member districts
Two-member districts were the norm in English elections from the thirteenth through most of the nineteenth century until massive redistricting in 1885. The American political system inherited its electoral laws from England, and the predominance of double-and other multi-member districts continued in the United States past the colonial period. The perspective of the time was more in favor of multi-member districts, where one of chief concerns with single-member districts was the excessive amount of special local legislation as observed by the New York Constitutional Commission in 1872 (Cox, 1984) . Since World War II, apportionments nonetheless led to a gradual adoption of single-member districts across the United States. 5 In political science, double-member districts used to be seen as a prospective remedy to the disproportionality in legislative representation associated with simple plurality. For Lijphart and Grofman (1984, p. 8) , ". . . a two-member district PR system could achieve the functional purpose of plurality even better than the plurality method itself." Recently, Carey and Hix (2011) revised the tradeoff associated with the district magnitude, and for a sample of elections from 1945 to 2006 in all democratic countries with a population of more than one million, they find an optimal district magnitude to be in the range of three to eight.
Currently, there are 9 assemblies in the U.S. states that use two-member districts and elect both representatives per district through plurality-at-large (dual voting, block voting). To demonstrate the performance of plurality-at-large, we calculate the shares of mixed (split) and nonmixed (non-split) electoral outcomes exploiting data from the most recent elections (2010-2012). 6 In Table 1 , the share of mixed outcomes is only 21.4-21.5% of all outcomes, measured either as the average from all districts or as the average of district averages. The low incidence of mixed outcomes suggests that replacing single-member districts by two-member districts may not improve representativeness. In theory, increasing the district magnitude improves representativeness of dispersed minorities at the expense of the representativeness of concentrated minorities. In the context of the U.S. states, the negative effect upon concentrated minorities seems 5 Another largely discussed example of the two-seat system with two positive votes is the 'binomial' open-list-PR system in Chile. In Chile, the system was designed in the last years of the Pinochet regime with the aim to strategically overrepresent a coalition of right-wing parties relative to a center-left coalition. In the binomial system, if two parties are competing, the minority party gains a seat in the district (i.e., half of the total seats) unless it obtains less than a third of the votes. To achieve that level of representation was strategic also with respect to a two-third qualified majority required for constitutional change. Lacy and Niou (1998) provide an analysis relevant to strategic position-taking in the Chilean binomial system. 6 Source: http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/State_legislative_chambers_ that_use_multi-member_districts, accessed 2 February, 2013. to outweigh the positive effect for dispersed minorities. The fact that two-member districts magnify disproportionality relative to single-member districts is seen as a major shortcoming of the two-member districts. Combined with the popular idea that single-member districts improve accountability, it is not surprising that reapportionments in many U.S. states are towards singlemember districts. Our paper aims to show that the source of disproportionality is primarily found in the low degree of discrimination available with the plurality-at-large rule not in the existence of the twomember districts. From our perspective, voters need multiple degrees of discrimination to incorporate secondary (here quality) considerations successfully into their ballots. In the class of scoring rules, this requires the simultaneous existence of both positive and negative votes.
In this paper, we conduct an elementary analysis of the electoral competition in two-member districts where we let candidates for office compete both in a conflicting (policy) dimension and in a non-conflicting (quality or valence) dimension. 7 The candidate's quality can also be interpreted as corruptability; hence, valence competition represents one of many channels between electoral rules and corruption (c.f., Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi, 2003). 8 7 In its broad definition, valence is used for any valuable personal characteristic including campaigning or networking skills, but in a narrow sense, valence is only for the qualities that voters value for their own sake such as integrity, competence, and dedication to public service. More specifically, Stone and Simas (2010) measure character-valence through seven indicators: personal integrity, an ability to work well with other leaders, an ability to find solutions to problems, competence, a grasp of the issues, qualifications to hold public office, and overall strength as a public servant. 8 Many effects of the electoral system upon the level of corruption are related to incentives and disincentives to raise rents depending on the size of the party system and coalitional behavior. These effects can be modeled
We assume that both policy preferences and valence characteristics are predetermined and known. The reason is to isolate the pure and direct effect of the electoral rule on the electoral expectations for the high-and low-quality candidates and thereby on the calculus of voting. We leave an interaction analysis of the electoral rules and strategic position-taking for further research. When parties endogenously determine the set of competing candidates, the literature agrees that low-quality candidates adopt extreme positions to soften valence competition, while high-quality candidates adopt centrist positions (Groseclose, 2001 We presume that only two dimensions emerge as relevant for describing the candidates. If only two dimensions matter, the non-conflicting valence dimension can end up either as (i) an irrelevant dimension (i.e., there is no tradeoff between quality and policy), (ii) a relevant and strong dimension (i.e., low-quality candidates will likely be ousted by high-quality candidates), or (iii) a relevant but weak dimension. Only the last option is non-trivial and will be explicitly considered.
With only two dimensions, only four types of candidates exist. Motivation for having only a few candidates draws from the large Duvergerian literature on the number of serious candidates as an increasing function of the district magnitude M. The idea is that small district magnitudes make some social divisions latent and not expressed electorally.
Most of the vast Duvergerian literature examines a two-party prediction for simple plurality (Duverger's Law). The early literature offers models with Duvergerian equilibria in which all votes for the second challenger vanish (Palfrey, 1989; Myerson and Weber 1993; Cox, 1994 ). Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013) replicate Duverger's Law in the presence of campaigning efforts. Dellis (2013) confirms Duverger Law for any top-scoring rule in a deterministic setting and risk aversion, where a top-scoring rule (a rule with a unique top score) is defined such that it allows the voter to cast a different score for the first and second candidate on the ballot. An exception is Patty, Snyder and Ting (2009) who point to the presence of 'too many' electoral equilibria in multi-candidate elections if the candidates are purely vote-seeking and adopt policy positions independently on the qualities of the candidates or parties. Persson and Tabellini (2001) identify two effects: The first effect of multi-party systems is in the coalitional bargaining stage. A party with ideological similarity to the proposer becomes cheaper to include in a coalition than an ideologically distant party, which would tend to claim large rents in the bargaining. The second effect is of diluted individual performance. For large coalitions and closed party-lists, the misconduct of individual incumbents is more difficult to monitor, detect, and punish in elections. In addition, there is a lower incentive for challengers to monitor and reveal an incumbent's underperformance in multi-party systems since revelation activity by one challenger generates an uncompensated positive externality for the other challengers (Charron, 2011). strategically. Among the most recent papers, Fujiwara (2011) uses a regression discontinuity in Brazilian mayoral elections to show that third-place candidates are more likely to be deserted in races under the simple plurality rule than in runoff elections.
In the analysis of multiple-seat districts, Cox (1994; 1997) predicts M + 1 viable parties and in the long run, M + 1 competing parties. This M + 1 result echoes results from all-pay auctions, where the number of contenders for a winner-take-all contest with M prizes is typically M + 1 (Siegel, 2009 ). The caveat is Cox formally develops the M + 1 rule for a single non-transferrable vote (a single positive vote for M > 1), and also his main evidence is primarily through districtlevel results from British and Japanese elections that used single non-transferrable voting.
The lack of a formal analysis of districts with larger magnitudes is also understandable because with larger magnitudes, there is a greater role for coordination on the nation-wide level and non-trivial linkages between district-wide and nation-wide competition (Cox, 1999) . Morelli (2004) develops a model, where for sufficiently asymmetric preferences across districts, the linkages revert Duvergerian predictions; hence, the policy outcome with a proportional rule is more moderate than the one with plurality. Recent evidence (e.g., Singer and Stephenson, 2009 ) is nevertheless supportive of the Duvergerian hypothesis; hence, maintaining a low number of serious candidates is a reasonable point of departure.
3 The binomial game with symmetry
Players
Consider two binary dimensions: policy is L or R, and quality is zero or one. Four generic types of candidates are admissible. We let the candidate list K involve one candidate per each generic
Each voter is either of two types, t = L, R. A group of voters is the ex ante majority if its expected size is larger than the expected size of the other group. A group is the ex post majority if its realized size is larger than the realized size of the other group. In this section, we build a type-symmetric binomial model where expected sizes are identical. Assume a large fixed number n ∈ N of voters. Purely for technical convenience, let ⌊ n 6 ⌋ = n 6 . In both population models, each voter's probability of being an L-type is drawn from an independent and identical Bernoulli distribution with parameter τ L ∈ (0, 1), where for type-symmetry, τ L = 1 2 . The number of L-voters is a random variable x ∈ N on the support N ≡ {x ∈ N : 0 x n} with a binomial distribution B(x; n; 1 2 ). In the main analysis, we simplify the notation to B(x). Voters learn their private types right before the elections and do not communicate their types to the other voters. Voters make an inference about the aggregate x by the posterior distribution functions, where the types' posterior probability distribution functions for L-type and R-types are B L (x; n; τ L ) and B R (x; n; τ L ). The difference of posteriors for L-voters and R-voters is evident from B L (x; n; p) = B(x − 1; n − 1; τ L ) for x 1 and B R (x; n; τ L ) = B(x; n − 1; τ L ) for x n − 1. 9 In particular, see
n , which imply that the posteriors of each type are 'optimistic' in a sense that for type t, the events of being in the ex post majority (t-majority events) are now seen as being more likely, and the events of being in the ex post minority (tminority events) are now seen as less likely. For example, L-voters expect any particular Lmajority event to be more likely than R-voters, b L (x) > b R (x) for x > n − x, and vice versa.
Each type t = L, R is characterized by the utility function u t (c) over the elected candidate c ∈ K, where the valuation of any elected candidate is invariant to the valuation of another elected candidate. Two separable arguments in the utility function are policy and quality of the candidate. Types are symmetrically antagonistic over the policy, and V > 1 denotes the common relative salience of the policy dimension to the corruption dimension. The assumption that the policy dimension is more salient than the quality dimension (ideological bias, see Krishna and Morgan, 2011) can be interpreted such that voters and the competing parties are sufficiently polarized; hence, voters consider the non-valent issue to be of first-order importance. By normalizing the benefit from the worst candidate to zero, the voters' objective functions are:
Electoral rules and admissible ballots
We consider a sub-class of scoring rules that are characterized by the maximal number of positive votes V + and the maximal number of negative votes V − , where votes to a single candidate cannot cumulate. In any scoring rule, each voter's ballot is a vector that specifies the number of points that the voter assigns to each candidate. The vectors of points of all voters are summed into a vector of scores, and for an M-seat district, the winning candidates are M candidates with the highest scores. Ties for the M-seat are broken neutrally; a winner of the last seat is chosen randomly among all candidates involved in the tie, each with equal probability. The reason is to make an electoral rule neutral to any other aspect but the ballot structure. 10 In our setting, each voter of type t submits a ballot,
Formally, the scoring rules that we admit have two characteristics: (i) Since the votes to a candidate cannot cumulate, the number of points that the voter gives to a candidate is 1, 0, or −1 (a positive vote, no vote, a negative vote): v c t ∈ {1, 0, −1}.
(ii) There are at maximum V + ∈ N positive votes and at maximum V − ∈ N negative votes on the ballot. (By the type of vote, we mean whether a particular vote is positive or negative.) Hence, the ballot can be truncated. The first characteristic admits 4 3 = 64 ballots, but the second characteristic reduces the set of feasible ballots. For the simplest rules such as plurality, we have only 5 feasible ballots. For the 2+1 rule, we have exactly 33 feasible ballots. 11 The largest set of 62 feasible ballots is admitted by combined approval-disapproval voting. 12 Additionally, we will restrict ourselves to admissible (weakly undominated) ballots.
In our sub-class of scoring rules, a particular electoral rule is a triplet (M,V + ,V − ). We will be examining the following rules: For M = 1, consider plurality (the 1+0 rule), the mixed system (the 1+1 rule), and approval voting (V + = #K − 1; for our quadruplet of candidates, the 3+0 rule). For M = 2, consider plurality-at-large (the 2+0 rule), the 2+1 rule, approval voting, and combined approval-disapproval voting (V + = V − = #K − 1; here the 3+3 rule).
In this section, we seek pure-strategy equilibria. A voting profile σ (v,t) in pure strategies satisfies σ (v,t) ∈ {0, 1} for any (v,t). The set of feasible pure-strategy voting profiles is a Cartesian product of the sets of feasible ballots, and this set is determined by the electoral rule. Throughout the analysis, it will be often useful to alternatively describe the pure strategy ballot not as a vector of points given to candidates, but as a vector of 'uses' of feasible votes, hence a vector of V + +V − elements. Each element is either active (a vote is put on the ballot for some candidate c ∈ K) or inactive (a vote is put on the ballot, and the element is ∅). We assume that voting is costless, which does not imply that each voter necessarily actively assigns all feasible votes. 13 Taking the inactivity of votes into account, the cardinality of the set of feasible pure strategy profiles in our electoral situation is only 25 for the plurality rule, but amounts to 999 for the 2+1 rule and 3, 844 for CAV.
of the electoral rules. If the aim is to see how the electoral rule itself affects the quality of serious candidates, the incentive to support high-quality candidates must be purely endogenous, and the electoral rule should be 'neutral' in the tradeoff. (iii) With the extra assumption in favor of high-quality candidates, it is likely that changes of the electoral rules will effectively have no difference. This will only stem from the fact that the tie-breaking rule will suppress the effects of the electoral rules. 11 These are permutations of the complete ballot (1, 1, 0, −1) and truncated ballots (1, 1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0),
, and (0, 0, 0, −1). 12 Given that V + = V − = #K − 1 = 3, ballots (1, 1, 1, 1) and (−1, −1, −1, −1) are not feasible. 13 Weak dominance does not imply activity of all votes. For a small set of candidates such as in our case, a voter can be made strictly worse off by being forced to use all votes actively (c.f., Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996) .
Let S c (x, σ ) be the score of candidate c ∈ K under voting profile σ and realization x. (In the proofs, we avoid arguments to save space.) By type-symmetry (see Assumption 1 below), the candidate's score is
We use the scores to characterize the candidates' probabilities of being elected for a given x for voting profile σ (v,t). For each candidate and each x, we use an indicator variable I c |x = 0, 1. A candidate's probability of being elected conditional on event x is Pr(I c = 1|x), and his or her seat probability is ∑ n k=0 Pr(I c = 1|x)b(x). For a given x, exactly M candidates with the highest scores S c (k, σ ) win M seats. Let the ordered candidates' scores be
In the case of a tie, recall that all candidates are treated identically, and the seat is allocated randomly. Thus,
where z is the number of candidates who satisfy
Pivotal events and seriousness
For each voting profile σ , we identify the events (i.e., the sets of realizations x) in which an individual voter is decisive, called pivotal events. The gains and losses in the pivotal events will shape the voter's best response ballot. More precisely, consider the profile σ and suppose any unilateral deviation of a single voter, characterized by the profile σ ′ . Pivotal events for the pair of profiles (σ , σ ′ ) are all events where the vector of candidates' probabilities of being elected changes. Notice that pivotal events directly depend on the given pair of profiles and indirectly are rule-specific in the sense that the electoral rule determines which feasible profiles σ and also which alternative profiles σ ′ are feasible given σ . To avoid excessive notation, we leave the analysis of the pivotal events to each particular electoral rule.
At this stage, it is only valuable to see that for the scoring rules where v c t ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, a pivotal event is either a tie or a near tie for the M-th seat. A tie x is characterized by S M (x, σ ) = S M+1 (x, σ ). For any electoral rule we consider, each tie for the M-th seat is obviously a pivotal event for some feasible pair (σ , σ ′ ). The remaining pivotal events are in near ties, where a necessary condition for a near tie is
. The reason to account for the differences of at most four points from the score of M-th candidate S M (x, σ ) is that in the class of rules using non-cumulated +1 points and −1 points, a single voter changes an individual candidate's score at maximum by two points (e.g., by adding a positive vote and withdrawing a negative point), and therefore, the relative scores of two candidates cannot be affected if the difference is by five points or more. Typically, however, the relevant near ties occur only for differences in scores by one or two points.
The set of pivotal events involves all sub-sets of the sets, including all singletons x. Henceforth, it is convenient to decompose the analysis of gains and losses into the analysis of singletons x. For any pivotal singleton x constructed from a pair of profiles (σ , σ ′ ), there must be at least a pair of candidates whose probabilities of getting elected at x, Pr(I c = 1|x), have changed. Any candidate whose probability of getting elected for a pivotal event x can change under some pair (σ , σ ′ ) is called a serious candidate in event x. A candidate is called serious if x ∈ N exists such that a candidate is serious in event x.
With the above classification of candidates, we can describe each active vote on the ballot (i.e., a positive or negative point) either as a serious or non-serious vote. A serious vote is cast to a serious candidate. By definition, a serious vote affects the seat probability of a corresponding serious candidate. A non-serious vote is a vote cast to a non-serious candidate.
Equilibrium concept
Besides a focus on the pure-strategy equilibria of admissible ballots, Assumption 1 characterizes the relevant equilibria as symmetric.
Assumption 1 (Symmetry) In a relevant equilibrium, ballots are characterized only by types and are type-symmetric.
The assumption involves two symmetries: Within-type symmetry (homogeneity) states that voters of an identical type behave in the equilibrium identically; the ballot of any L-type is v L and the ballot of any R-type is v R . Unlike Poisson game where payoff-irrelevant type sub-divisions have zero effect on marginal probabilities for strategy profiles (Myerson, 1998) , multinomial games are not invariant to payoff-irrelevant type subdivisions. Hence, we must directly assume that there is no device that would instruct the voters of the same type to differ in their ballots. Across-type symmetry states that the L-voter's ballot is type-symmetric to the R-voter's ballot;
As a shortcut, we can henceforth represent each symmetric equilibrium voting profile only by the ballot v L . The next assumption is to consider equilibria that arise only in large electorates.
Assumption 2 (Large binomial game) An equilibrium for feasible population size n is relevant only if the equilibrium exists also for any feasible population size n ′ > n.
Similar to , we additionally apply a sincere stability refinement. This refinement is a behaviorally relevant and technically useful perturbation in large voting games. A strict equilibrium is always sincerely stable because additional pivotal events that arise with very small numbers of sincere votes must tend to vanish in importance in a large electorate relative to the original pivotal events. Sincere stability matters only for weak equilibria that contain no pivotal events because both types submit highly correlated (in our case, often identical) ballots, and the set of winners is independent of the event.
Assumption 3 (Sincere stability) A weak equilibrium is relevant only ifs > 1 exists such that any voting game perturbed by any 0 < s s of extra sincere voters contains this equilibrium.
Finally, we describe our approach in identifying the equilibria in the binomial game:
1. We construct a set of symmetric pure-strategy voting profiles (Assumption 1). We eliminate profiles with those apparently inadmissible ballots 14 that involve a positive vote to the
in order to obtain the set of candidate strategy profiles V .
2. For each profile σ ∈ V , we derive the corresponding candidates' score functions S c (x, σ ), c ∈ K and the function S M (x, σ ).
3. For the score functions, we identify pivotal events that are either ties or near ties for the M-th seat. This is relatively straightforward given that the score functions are linear in a single variable x.
4. The pivotal events identify the sets of serious candidates and non-serious candidates.
5. We check whether the voting strategies are best responses. That is, for each type t, we consider all admissible unilateral deviations. Relevant deviations are such that a pair (c, x) exists where Pr(I c = 1|x) changes.
6. For each relevant deviation, we calculate each voter's expected win gain (positive or negative) at each pivotal singleton x where the candidates' probabilities of being elected have changed. The total expected gain is then the weighted sum of the expected gains times the posterior probabilities of the pivotal singletons b t (x). A profile σ is an equilibrium only if each total expected gain is non-positive.
7. For all weak or strict equilibria in admissible strategies, we check whether the equilibrium is invariant to the size of the electorate n (Assumption 2), and we control for sincere stability (Assumption 3).
An electoral outcome O(σ , x) is a function that yields the vector of the candidates' probabilities of being elected for every x given profile σ . When these probabilities are zero or one, we can alternatively speak of the set of elected candidates. When characterizing electoral outcomes generated in the relevant equilibria, we will be primarily checking the pivotal events x when an electoral rule assigns in the equilibrium a seat to a Condorcet winner with probability one and the events when a Condorcet loser gains a seat with a positive probability. With two types of voters, Condorcet winners and Condorcet losers are defined by the preferences of the ex post majority group of voters. For x n 2 , R 1 is the Condorcet winner and L 0 is the Condorcet loser. For x n 2 , L 1 is the Condorcet winner and R 0 is the Condorcet loser.
Single-member districts
Most of the pivotal voting analysis in past literature has focused on single-member districts. Here, we briefly illustrate the effects of enriching the plurality ballot by extra positive and negative votes in our electoral situation. We will observe that extra positive votes help to alleviate coordination problems, while extra negative votes are typically less effective because of generating too many serious candidates.
By Proposition 1, the plurality rule exhibits a classic coordination problem with multiple relevant equilibria: Either low-quality candidates {L 0 , R 0 } compete against each other, or highquality candidates {L 1 , R 1 } compete against each other. Both equilibria share a unique pivotal tie x = Both equilibria are strict; hence, the single positive vote is always active and serious. The first equilibrium is associated with a sincere ballot, v L = (1, 0, 0, 0). For any x, the Condorcet winner is elected and the Condorcet loser is not elected. The second equilibrium is associated with a non-sincere ballot, v L = (0, 1, 0, 0), but voting is sincere over the subset of serious candidates, K ′ = {L 0 , R 0 }. For any x, the Condorcet winner is a non-serious candidate, thus not elected.
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The Condorcet loser is surely elected in a tie x = n 2 . The first equilibrium Pareto-dominates the second equilibrium.
What is the effect of adding a negative vote to the ballot? In the mixed (1+1) rule, we observe that a negative vote increases the pool of serious candidates. More specifically, the voters tend to cast positive and negative votes for a pair of serious candidates. Negative points from one group then cancel out positive points from the opposing group. As a result, in a tie x = n 2 , serious candidates have scores that equal zero. However, the other two candidates also have scores that equal zero; hence, they must also be considered serious.
With all candidates considered serious, strategic mixing becomes very likely. Mixing then implies that low-quality candidates win seats with a positive probability. Proposition 2 proves that the incentive to mix is absent only when the pair {L 1 , R 1 } attracts both positive and negative votes, and ideological bias V is very low.
Proposition 2 (Mixed rule) In the mixed rule, a relevant equilibrium exists if and only if V 2. In the relevant equilibrium, L-voters cast positive votes to L 1 and negative votes to R 1 , and R-voters cast positive votes to R 1 and negative votes to L 1 .
In a special case, the electoral outcome under profile v L = (1, 0, −1, 0) is identical to the outcome for the Pareto-superior equilibrium from plurality. Thus, we may conclude that the negative vote helps to eliminate the Pareto-inferior equilibrium but only in a small parametrical sub-space. In the remaining cases, once voters focus on reducing the chances of the opposing candidates, they cancel out each other's votes, and there is a window of opportunity for the weak and non-serious candidates with strategic mixing as a result.
What is the effect of adding a positive vote, which for truncated ballots amounts to approval voting? In our particular electoral situation, admissibility is sufficient to yield a unique favorable equilibrium under AV. The reason is the strategy v L = (0, 1, 0, 0) characterizing the Pareto-inferior equilibrium is weakly dominated by v L = (1, 1, 0, 0).
Proposition 3 (AV, M = 1) For approval voting in single-member districts, L-voters approve L 1 and R-voters approve R 1 .
The unique equilibrium ballot under approval voting is identical to the Pareto-superior ballot in plurality, but in contrast to plurality, the equilibrium now involves two inactive votes. This may be considered as a disadvantage if we consider, instead of weak dominance, a selection criterion that requires all votes to be active unless inactivity brings a positive gain.
Two-member districts
We now proceed to the analysis of double-member districts. We will discuss both quality and representativeness of the candidates. In single-member districts, the ex post majority always wins the seat, and the only performance criterion is the incidence of high-quality candidates. For two-seat districts, the ex post majority also wins the first seat, but the second seat may fall to either of the groups. Thus, another natural criterion is how an electoral system protects minority interests. We will ask for which rule and under what conditions the second seat is allocated to a high-quality candidate of the minority group.
If only two positive votes can be cast, Proposition 4 finds a sincere and strict equilibrium with all votes being active. In the electoral outcome, the ex ante majority always wins both seats. The second seat is always for the inferior quality candidate.
Proposition 4 (Plurality-at-large)
Next, we consider the electoral rules with arbitrary numbers of votes, namely AV (positive votes) and CAV (positive and negative votes). For CAV, although the voters are given the option to discriminate in two dimensions by arbitrarily mixing positive and negative votes, they strategically 'overstate' their preferences and discriminate only by a single degree. 15 In the relevant equilibrium of both rules, electoral competition only reduces to the single policy dimension, exactly as in plurality-at-large.
Proposition 5 (AV and CAV, M = 2) For approval and combined approval-disapproval voting in two-member districts, L-voters approve {L
Next, we consider the 2+1 rule. Proposition 6 identifies a unique, sincere, and strict equilibrium where all candidates are serious if V 3. Interestingly, voters focus on punishing the electorally weaker candidate from the other camp instead of punishing the electorally stronger candidate. Like in plurality-at-large, the positive votes are cast along the more salient dimension (first-order discrimination). The difference is the negative vote is now cast along the less salient dimension (second-order discrimination). (ii) If L-group is in the minority (x = x A ), the stronger candidate L 1 competes with the weaker candidate R 0 for the second seat. The nominal gain is V + 1; hence, this minority event is nominally more valuable.
The second effect concerns the relative frequencies of pivotal events. We know that
. This reduces the appeal of sincere voting. Nevertheless, it can be easily proved that this effect is specific for the binomial game and can be suppressed in a symmetric finite Poisson game, where the environmental equivalence property makes both pivotal ties, x A and x B , equally likely.
The beneficial performance of the 2+1 rule can be attributed to the extended scope for a voter's discrimination associated with an additional negative vote. Once voters protect their primary policy interests by means of two positive votes, they can secure their secondary quality interests by an extra vote. A crucial difference is whether the extra vote is positive or negative. If the extra third vote is positive such as in approval voting, the restriction that votes of a certain type cannot cumulate for a single candidate binds. In contrast, this restriction of cumulation does not bind the use of an extra negative vote.
The existence of multiple ties is sustained because of the unequal number of non-cumulated positive and negative votes (V + > V − ). The unequal number generates a difference between positive and negative votes in the substitutability (transferability) of votes across events. While a negative vote can be transferred between candidates from the opposing group, a positive vote cannot be transferred because positive votes cannot cumulate. If positive votes could be freely transferred, the voter would deviate by shifting all positive and negative votes to a single most important pivotal event, and multiple ties would disappear. The inability to transfer the positive votes associated with an impossibility to cumulate votes is thus one of the necessary conditions for having two degrees of discrimination.
A comparison of the electoral outcomes
Only two electoral outcomes emerge out of the relevant strict profiles. In a non-mixed electoral outcome denoted O n , the ex post majority always elects its first two candidates. This is associated 0, 0 instead of a low-quality majority candidate (R 0 , respectively L 0 ).
We assess quality and the representativeness of the electoral outcomes. In terms of quality, O n delivers only a single high-quality candidate for all realizations except for x = n 2 . In the special case of x = n 2 , O n even elects Condorcet losers with a positive probability. O m involves two high-quality candidates for any n 3 < x < 2n 3 and never elects a Condorcet loser. Thus, O m unambiguously ranks better in terms of quality. In terms of representation, a minority group never receives a seat under O n ; for O m , it receives a seat for n 3 < x < 2n 3 . The outcome that is more desirable depends on the weight assigned to the representation of the minority. One approach is to compare the outcomes in terms of utilitarian welfare. By this criterion, an ex post minority candidate is preferred if the ex post minority is not too small and if the common value (quality) of the minority candidate is much higher than the common value of the majority candidate.
For computational convenience, we compare the welfare of the two outcomes as an approximation at n → ∞. Specifically, let φ := For any outcome O ∈ {O n , O m }, the expected utilitarian welfare from the second seat is
where c 2 (O, φ ) denotes the second elected candidate for a given share of L-voters φ under a given outcome O. To start with, we derive the socially optimal candidate. Given the absence of the first-seat candidate, we call the socially optimal candidate for the second seat the second-best candidate. For φ 1 2 , R 1 is the first-seat candidate, and
Trivially, since u t (L 1 ) > u t (L 0 ) for both types, the second-best candidate for φ 
The equality rewrites intoφ (V + 1) = (1 −φ )(V − 1) and yields a threshold levelφ := V −1
2V .
The threshold defines the second-best efficient candidate as follows:
The threshold has intuitive comparative statics: With an increasing relative importance of common value (decreasing V ), the thresholdφ decreases. Thus, it is socially more important to establish a high-quality (but minority) candidate than a majority (but low-quality) candidate.
Proposition 7 proves that under a necessary condition for the existence of a mixed outcome (i.e., the existence of a strict equilibrium under the 2+1 rule),φ 1 3 . Hence, the mixed outcome more frequently elects the second-best efficient candidate and welfare-dominates the non-mixed outcome. 
The 2+1 rule
To begin with, we demonstrate that a sincere profile of the 2+1 rule ceases to exist under asymmetry. Let x L and x R be the numbers of sincere L-ballots and R-ballots, which are Poisson variables with means nτ L and nτ R . The main difference between Poisson and binomial setting is that a particular tie is not characterized by a unique realization x, but by a set of realizations (x L , x R ). To realize whether the tie is a relevant pivotal event even for n → ∞, we must calculate the magnitude of the tie. Intuitively, the magnitude is a 'speed' at which the probability decreases towards zero. Only those events with the highest magnitudes (i.e., the lowest speed) are the relevant events. 16 W.l.o.g., we consider that L-voters constitute an ex ante majority,
Second-rank pivot events are either two-candidate or four-candidate ties. The four-candidate pivot tie (x L = x R = 0) has a magnitude of −1, which is the lowest feasible magnitude; as a consequence, this pivot will be irrelevant for a sufficiently large n.
What remains is a pair of two-candidate ties:
Given that 2x L = x R implies the constraint x R x L (S R 1 > S L 1 ), the unconstrained magnitude is the effective magnitude for any τ L . The unconstrained magnitude of Tie 2 is maximized at 16 A formal treatment of the problem and tools for the calculation of the magnitudes are available in Appendix A1 in Bouton and Castanheira (2012).
; hence, the unconstrained magnitude is the effective magnitude for any τ L > 1 2 . Since this effective magnitude is larger than the effective magnitude of Tie 1 for τ > 1 2 > τ R , only Tie 2 is a relevant pivot event according to magnitude theorem (Myerson, 2000) . The L-voter thus disregards Tie 1 for any sufficiently large n and deviates by strategically casting a negative vote for the high-quality candidate R 1 . In a large Poisson game, a sincere profile thus remains an equilibrium only in a knife-edge case in a symmetric district, where
In contrast, in the binomial game, a sincere profile may remain an equilibrium for small asymmetries if V < 3. The binomial setting is illustrative: The likelihood ratio of the two ties x A and x B matters as it influences each voter deciding which of the two events to address with a single negative vote. If t-group becomes ex ante majority, the ex-ante-majority event of t is increasingly more likely, and the ex-ante-minority event of t is decreasingly less likely. For ex-ante-minority voters, sincere voting remains the best response because the more valuable minority event is now also an increasingly more likely event. For ex-ante-majority voters, however, the more valuable minority event becomes very unlikely, and the voters consider using the negative vote rather in the more likely (albeit nominally less valuable) majority event.
We now identify a mixed equilibrium of a largely asymmetric district in a large Poisson game. The mixed-strategy equilibrium of the 2+1 rule features a sincere ballot by (ex ante minority) R-voters and a symmetric mix of sincere and strategic ballots by (ex ante majority) L-voters. Interestingly, the equilibrium structure is invariant to the degree of asymmetry in a large Poisson game if the asymmetry is sufficiently large.
We let α ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that any L-voter adopts a strategic ballot. To keep notation as simple as possible, let x A and x B be the number of sincere and strategic L-ballots, which are Poisson variables with means τ A := (1 − α)nτ L and τ B := αnτ L . For convenience, we introduce shares χ J = 
Candidates' scores are S L
Again, we focus only upon two-candidate ties. In contrast to the sincere profile, we now have to account for four types of two-candidate ties. The reason is that L-voters have abandoned purely sincere voting, and therefore S R 1 S R 0 . The ambiguity of the sign inequality generates two extra second-rank ties: Tie 3 (S L 1 S L 0 = S R 0 S R 1 ) and Tie 4 (S R 0 S L 1 = S R 1 S L 0 ) in addition to Tie 1 and Tie 2 as analyzed above.
The main idea of Proposition 8 is a mixed strategy in a large Poisson game requires multiple relevant pivot ties (c.f., . By the magnitude theorem, pivot ties are relevant only if their magnitude is identical and the maximum out of all magnitudes. In our case, with symmetric mixing, Tie 2 and Tie 3 have equal magnitude, mag (piv L 0 /R 1 ) = mag (piv L 0 /R 0 ); hence, the ratio of their probabilities will be constant with n → ∞. 17 Ties 1 and 4 will have a lower magnitude, and the voters will thus cast their votes to affect only pivots at Ties 2 and 3. This implies sincere voting from R-voter (to outvote L 0 ) and a mixed ballot from L-voter (to outvote both R 0 and R 1 ).
In the binominal game, the pivot tie is characterized by a unique x. In a Poisson game, the pivot tie is characterized by an equality. Namely, for our class of mixed-strategy profiles, each pivot tie is fully characterized by a triplet of binary indicators
For Tie 1, 
Lemma 1 (Magnitudes) The ballots which maximize unconstrained magnitude of a tie characterized by d R
χ R = d A χ A + d B χ B
can be written as a triplet of the offset ratios
The magnitude is unconstrained if χ A χ (Ties 1 and 2), respectively χ A χ (Ties 3 and 4),
. 17 To put exactly, a small ε n is involved in mixing, where lim n→∞ ε n = 0. 18 Closed-form solutions are extremely complex. We derive for illustration a solution for Tie 1. First, we use Lemma 1 and enter
The magnitude-maximizing ballots are characterized by the root of the polynomial
A .
The ballots which maximize constrained magnitude of the tie can be written as (χ
Our approach in the analysis of ties is to focus on how unconstrained magnitudes change in the parameters (α, τ L ). To start with, we calculate for each pivot tie parametrical cases when the respective unconstrained magnitude is maximal. This case occurs if all expected ballots in fact characterize the pivot tie, nτ J = x J , or χ J = τ J for J = A, B, R. Intuitively, with Poisson distributions drawn out of these parameters, the probability mass concentrates with n → ∞ exactly in the pivot tie, and the pivot tie is the most likely event in a large Poisson game. Consequently, χ A + χ B + χ R = τ A + τ B + τ R = 1, and the maximal magnitude is χ A + χ B + χ R − 1 = 0.
We introduce the magnitude-maximizing function τ
Lemma 2 exploits the magnitude-maximizing functions to characterize the sign of the offset ratios relative to one, sgn( 
Lemma 2 will be exploited in two main ways. First, notice that for symmetric mixing α =
this is a sufficient condition for Ties 2 and 3 to have unconstrained magnitudes.
The second specific use is for proof of stability. With Lemma 2, we demonstrate that in the equilibrium, if L-voters vote more sincerely (α decreases), then Tie 2 will have a higher magnitude than Tie 3, and L-voters will deviate by strategically outvoting R 1 . Similarly, if Lvoters vote more strategically (α increases), then Tie 3 will have a higher magnitude than Tie 2, and L-voters will deviate by sincerely outvoting R 0 . 
AV, CAV, and 2+0
In a symmetric binomial game, all electoral rules except for the 2+1 rule generate a non-mixed electoral outcome. All players approve only candidates of their type and disapprove candidates of the other type (if negative votes are available). Our next result is that such pure policy competition is robust to the introduction of a large Poisson game and holds for any asymmetry and any valuation.
Proposition 9 (Non-mixed equilibrium) For plurality-at-large, AV, and CAV, the approval of own-group candidates and the disapproval of other-group candidates establishes an equilibrium for any parameters.
How does the mixed equilibrium outcome of the 2+1 rule rank relative to non-mixed outcome? Consider quality first. The non-mixed outcome (almost) always elects a single highquality candidate. The mixed-outcome differs only in realizations where either a double-quality pair {L 1 , R 1 } or a single-quality pair {L 1 , R 0 } are elected. Given that S L 1 S L 0 , no other pair can be elected. Since the probability of a double-quality pair {L 1 , R 1 } is positive, the incidence of high-quality candidates is larger. Although the mixed negative vote of L-voters reduces the beneficial effect of the negative vote in terms of quality, the effect remains positive.
Also, ex post minorities are better represented. In the non-mixed outcome, an ex post minority candidate is (almost) never elected. In the mixed outcome, an ex post minority candidate is elected if any type-mixed pair are elected, i.e., under {L 1 , R 1 } or {L 1 , R 0 }.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have identified the equilibrium voting outcomes for alternative scoring electoral rules in a stylized electoral situation with a single ideological dimension and four generic types of candidates. Two randomly sized groups of rational voters vote primarily to promote their preferred ideologies, and secondarily to support high-quality candidates. We have compared the outcomes in single-member and two-member districts for scoring rules that differ in the maximal numbers of positive and negative votes.
In our electoral situation, plurality-at-large almost always ends in a non-split outcome, where two candidates of the same group gain both seats. This prediction corresponds to 80% of outcomes of the recent elections into the assemblies of U.S. states that actually employ pluralityat-large in double-member districts. The large incidence of non-split outcomes is due to a large correlation of scores of party candidates.
In the class of scoring rules, the correlation can be weakened by adding more votes on the ballot. However, by adding an unrestricted number of votes (i.e., approval voting with an arbitrary number of positive votes or combined approval-disapproval voting with an arbitrary number of positive and negative votes), the plurality-at-large outcomes only replicate.
In contrast, the 2+1 rule yields an equilibrium with a large frequency of split outcomes; hence, it protects interests of the minority voting group relatively better than alternative twoseat electoral rules. For symmetric distributions, the 2+1 rule even motivates all voters to cast a negative vote only to the low-quality candidate from the opponent's group. Two positive votes are cast along the more salient ideological dimension, and a single negative vote is cast along the less salient quality dimension. Under group asymmetry, this behavior remains unchanged for minority voters while majority voters mix their negative votes.
Although the main purpose of the paper has been to compare the 2+1 electoral rule with plurality-at-large and the closest alternatives in double-member districts, a more general purpose of the paper is to understand how scoring electoral rules in multi-member districts affect the voters' tradeoffs over valent and conflicting political issues. Adding an extra negative vote has a different effect than adding an extra positive vote because the expected scores of serious candidates and non-serious candidates are affected differently and because of the restraint on cumulating multiple points to a single candidate.
We find that the simultaneous presence of negative and positive votes increases the voters' scope for discrimination. Nevertheless, an effectively discriminative mix of positive and negative votes must avoid two phenomena: (i) the underdog effect of an excessively large set of viable candidates and (ii) the incentive to overstate, which results in the serious candidates receiving only points −1, 1, and not points −1, 0, 1. The 2+1 rule avoids both by limiting the number of negative votes relative to the number of the positive votes.
Our electoral situation has a direct parallel to the widely studied divided majority situation. In both electoral situations, voters seek multiple objectives: (i) the coordination of own group (against the other group), (ii) quality-discrimination within own group, and (iii) qualitydiscrimination within the other group. Plurality cannot achieve all the objectives at the same time. show that approval voting effectively aggregates information and avoids coordination failure in a divided majority situation. The voters achieve the first and second objective by mixing multiple ballots in a mixed strategy. In our electoral situation, some voters achieve the first and third objective at once by a single ballot in a pure-strategy. In brief, the two-level discrimination involved in the 2+1 rule promotes multiple objectives by means of a single ballot. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 (Mixed)
Since the 1+1 rule contains weakly more votes of any type than the 1+0 rule, any deviation present in the 1+0 rule is also a deviation in the 1+1 rule. This principle will be used in other proofs as well. When using this principle, however, bear in mind that M-seat ties count; hence, M must be constant for the applicability of the principle.
• For any equilibrium profile from the 1+0 rule, L-voter deviates by using his or her negative vote. The negative vote changes the near tie x = n 2 − 1 into a tie and wins tie x = n 2 .
• Positive vote inactive, negative vote active: Two candidates A and B (those not receiving negative votes) are serious for every x. If L-voter deviates by casting a positive vote to the preferred candidate out of A, B, he or she wins all realizations x = 1, . . . , n (but obviously not the realization x = 0). This is a strict improvement for x = 1, . . . , n − 1. For x = n, there may be a loss if candidate D, who is serious in event n, is very valuable. However, for a sufficiently large n, the discrete loss in a single realization is always compensated for by the sum of discrete gains in n − 1 realizations.
We are left with those profiles where all votes are active. We first rule out profiles where a pair of candidates A, B receives positive votes and a pair C, D receives negative votes: There is a unique pivot tie x = n 2 . In all pivotal events, A and B compete for the seat. C and D are not serious candidates. L-voter deviates by transferring the negative vote to the worse of the candidates A and B.
Thus, only two candidates receive both positive and negative votes. Thus, these votes cancel out in tie x = n 2 , where S c (x) = 0 for any c ∈ K. In the tie, the expected payoff is
with the 1st candidate L 1 (gain). Also, L-voter changes the win of L 0 at near tie x = n 2 + 1 into a tie between L 1 and L 0 (gain). The elected candidate for x < n 2 and x > n 1 + 1 is not changed. This is not an equilibrium. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3 (AV, M = 1)
First of all, we consider equilibrium profiles from the 1+0 rule: To rule out the Pareto-inferior profile, we use ballot v L = (0, 1, 0, 0) is weakly dominated by ballot v L = (1, 1, 0, 0) . For the Pareto-superior profile, only two candidates are serious. L-voter supports the better of the two serious candidates. Thus, L-voter cannot add an extra positive vote to improve his or her payoff. Also, the ballot v L = (1, 0, 0, 0) is not weakly dominated by any other ballot since in alternative profiles, there might be a tie between the 1st and 2nd (or 3rd) candidates, and casting the additional positive vote may imply a utility loss in the tie. The Pareto-superior profile remains the equilibrium profile.
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The next set of profiles involve two positive votes:
• Votes for the 1st and 3rd candidates, v L = (1, 0, 1, 0) : In any x, there is a tie between L 1 and R 1 . L-voter deviates by withdrawing the positive vote for R 1 .
• Votes for two different pairs of candidates: In any x = n 2 , there is a tie within the pair of preferred candidates. Suppose L-voter prefers candidates A and B, and u L (A) > u L (B) . Then, L-voter deviates by withdrawing the positive vote for B. This implies a gain for x = n 2 + 1, . . . , n and a potential loss at x = n 2 . For a sufficiently large n, the discrete loss in a single realization is always compensated for by discrete gains in n 2 − 1 realizations.
Finally, consider all three votes to be cast, v L = (1, 1, 1, 0) . Then, the configuration is identical to the 1+1 rule with only one negative vote active. Two candidates A and B (those not receiving negative votes) are serious for every x. If L-voter deviates by casting a positive vote to the preferred candidate out of A, B, he or she wins all realizations x = 1, . . . , n (but obviously not the realization x = 0). This is a strict improvement for x = 1, . . . , n − 1. For x = n, there may be a loss if candidate D, who is serious in event n, is very valuable. However, for a sufficiently large n, the discrete loss in a single realization is always compensated for by the sum of discrete gains in n − 1 realizations.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4 (Plurality-at-lage)
W.l.o.g., we examine the deviations of L-voter in the set of admissible ballots. We prove that all votes must be active:
• With all votes inactive, v L = (0, 0, 0, 0), all candidates are serious for every x, and L-voter deviates by v L = (1, 1, 0, 0).
• Vote for a single candidate A. L 0 ) to any other candidate (R 1 or R 0 ) induces a tie, and this makes L-voter strictly worse off. Thus, this is a strict equilibrium for any n. As a sincere equilibrium, the profile is sincerely stable.
• Vote for the 1st and 3rd candidates, v L = (1, 0, 1, 0 
There is no pivotal event, and all candidates are non-serious. This is a weak equilibrium. We prove that it is not sincerely stable. Consider L-voter who expects x L of sincere L-voters to vote v L = (1, 1, 0, 0 ), x R of sincere R-voters to vote v R = (0, 0, 1, 1) , and x S of strategic voters to vote v S = (1, 0, 1, 0) independently on their ideological type.
Pivotal events arise under either of three cases:
Conditional on each of the two events, the best response is sincere ballot v L = (1, 1, 0, 0).
There are three pivotal events:
Conditional on any of the three events, the respective best response set involves sincere ballot v L = (1, 1, 0, 0).
-x S 2: There are two pivotal events known from the previous case:
To sum up, the sincere ballot is the best response in any pivotal event; hence, it constitutes a best response without assessing likelihood ratios of the probabilities. Therefore, the profile is not sincerely stable.
• Vote for the 2nd and 3rd candidates, v L = (0, 1, 1, 0): There is a unique pivot tie x = n 2 , where all four candidates compete for the seat. At the tie, L-voter becomes better off by transferring a positive vote from the 3rd candidate R 1 to the 1st candidate L 1 .
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5 (AV and CAV, M = 2)
A.5.1 AV (3+0), M = 2 Since the 3+0 rule contains weakly more votes of any type than the 2+0 rule, any deviation present in the 2+0 rule is also a deviation in the 3+0 rule. (An identical sincere stability refinement applies here because the ballot v L = (1, 1, 0, 0) can be considered sincere both in 2+0 and 3+0.) We investigate whether the profile from the 2+0 rule remains in the equilibrium for the 3+0 rule:
• Votes for the 1st and 2nd candidates, v L = (1, 1, 0, 0): There is a unique pivot tie x = n 2 , where all four candidates compete for the seat, and the expected payoff from both seats is V + 1. An extension of the strategy set by approval voting means that at the tie, L-voter now considers a deviation to v L = (1, 1, 1, 0 ). This wins a single seat for R 1 at x = n 2 , and the payoff from the first seat is 1. There is a tie for the second seat for the remaining candidates, and the expected payoff from the second seat is 2V +1
3 . This deviation makes L-voter worse off because 1 + 2V +1 3 < V + 1 is equivalent to 1 < V . At the same time, this deviation has no effect on the probabilities of being elected at any x = n 2 . Thus, this profile remains as an equilibrium.
Additionally, consider all three votes to be cast, v L = (1, 1, 1, 0) . In contrast to M = 1, ties for the second seat are only for the extreme realizations x ∈ {0, n}. Consider now L's deviation to v L = (1, 1, 0, 0) (a vote for the 3rd candidate is withdrawn). We have effects at three realizations:
• In tie x = n, L 1 and L 0 win the two seats, and the payoff from the two candidates is 2V + 1.
The expected payoff without a deviation was • In the near tie x = n − 1, there is now a tie over the second seat between R 1 and L 0 ; hence, the expected payoff is V + 1 + V +1 2 . The expected payoff without any deviation was V + 2; hence, there is a gain
• In the near tie x = 1, L 1 gains the first seat, and R 1 and R 0 now compete for the second seat. The payoff is V + 1 + 1 2 . The expected payoff without any deviation was V + 2; hence, there is a loss −
, the deviation makes L-voter better off if
The condition rewrites into V The 3+3 rule admits all ballots under 2+1 and 3+0 rules. Formally, the set of profiles Ψ 3+3 satisfies Ψ 3+3 ⊃ Ψ 2+1 and Ψ 3+3 ⊃ Ψ 3+0 . Therefore, we first verify the stability of the equilibria identified for these rules. For approval voting (3+0), we rule out all profiles on the grounds of inadmissibility; by admissibility, the worst candidate must receive a negative vote. For profiles identified by the 2+1 rule:
• v L = (1, 0, 1, −1) (a weak equilibrium for 2+1): No event is serious; hence, this remains a weak equilibrium. In Proof to Proposition 6, we have found that the original profile is dominated by the ballot v L = (1, 1, 0, −1), which also holds in this electoral rule because Ψ 3+3 ⊃ Ψ 2+1 . Thus, this profile is not sincerely stable.
• v L = (1, 1, 0, −1) (a strict equilibrium for 2+1): Each voter adds an extra negative vote to the high-quality candidate of the other group in order to change the winner in her less valuable pivotal event.
We examine all extra admissible profiles relative to the 2+1 rule. We begin with those that admit two or three negative votes, which is not feasible under 2+1:
wins this tie against R 1 and R 0 , and no other effect takes place.
• v L = (1, 1, −1, −1): There is a unique pivot tie x = n 2 , where all four candidates compete for the seat. In a tie, any deviation makes L-voter strictly worse off. In a near tie x = n 2 + 1, any decrease in the points of own candidates (L 1 or L 0 ) and/or any increase in the points of the other candidates (R 1 or R 0 ) cannot make L-voter better. Thus, this is a strict equilibrium.
•
Hence, this is a weak equilibrium. To examine sincere stability, note that
where (x L , x R ) is for the numbers of sincere L-voters and R-voters, and (s L , s R ) is for the numbers of strategic L-voters and R-voters.
-s L + s R = 0. All candidates are serious and a sincere ballot is in the best response. •
Hence, this is a weak equilibrium. We examine sincere stability. This ballot involves the punishment of L 0 which requires a pivotal event exists where L 0 competes with
This is satisfied only for s L = s R = 0, but then all candidates are serious in a tie, and the best response is to support both {L 1 , L 0 }. Thus, the profile is not sincerely stable.
Finally, we examine the profiles that involve negative votes (unlike 3+0) and have more than two positive votes (unlike 2+1). This yields a single admissible profile: 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6 (2+1)
The 2+1 rule admits all ballots under the 2+0 rule. Thus, any deviation present in the set of profiles for 2+0 rule, Ψ 2+0 , is also a deviation in the set of profiles for the 2+1 rule, Ψ 2+1 ⊃ Ψ 2+0 . We first investigate whether the two equilibrium profiles from the 2+0 rule remain in the Consider now only a single negative vote being active. All such profiles involve pivotal ties for any x. All candidates are serious. L-voter deviates by casting positive votes for the 1st and 2nd candidates. The main reason for the improvement is for any x, a positive vote for the 2nd candidate cannot reduce the probability of the 1st candidate being elected, given that also the 1st candidate now obtains a positive vote.
Consider a positive and a negative vote being active. We exploit across-type symmetry to obtain only the following: Suppose L-voter supports A and punishes C.
• • R-voter supports C and punishes A, and The remaining profiles are for all three votes being active. Trivially, we eliminate profiles where a positive and negative vote from one voter is for the same candidate because this would be the equivalent of casting no vote for the candidate and using only a single active negative vote. (These ballots have been eliminated under Ψ 2+0 .) We are left with five profiles.
• Ballot v L = (1, −1, 1, 0) . There is no pivotal event, and all candidates are non-serious. This is a weak equilibrium but not in admissible strategies.
• Ballot v L = (1, 0, 1, −1). There is no pivotal event, and all candidates are non-serious. This is a weak equilibrium in admissible strategies, but we will prove that it is not sincerely stable. Let (s L , s R ) be the extra strategic L-voters and R-voters, where
Pivotal events involve a tie or near tie S L 1 = S R 0 or S R 1 = S L 0 . L-voter thus never supports the third candidate R 1 because R 1 is serious only in events where also L 0 is serious. In other words, the motivation to support the third candidate exists only if the support of third candidate R 1 reduces the seat probability of the fourth candidate R 0 . Yet this is impossible given that R 1 is not competing with R 0 , S R 1 > S R 0 .
• Ballot v L = (1, 1, 0, −1) . The vector of score functions is (x, 2x − n, n − x, n − 2x). There 
which is equivalent to V < 3. Under this condition, the sincere profile is a strict equilibrium. For V = 3, the sincere profile is a weak (and sincerely stable) equilibrium.
• 
The expected gain of a deviation is always positive,
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7 (Welfare)
By Proposition 6, the sufficient and necessary condition for a strict equilibrium under the 2+1 rule is V 3. For V 3,φ 
A.8 Proof of Lemma 1 (Magnitudes)
The first step in the maximization is to fix x R and obtain
. The second step is to enter the equality back into the maximized magnitude, and by optimization receive
We have to check if these ballots comply with the constraints. The only constraint that must be evaluated is S R 0 ⋚ S R 1 , or equivalently χ A ⋚ χ B . Specifically, Ties 1 and 2 require χ A ≥ χ B , and Ties 3 and 4 require χ A χ B . Using 
A.9 Proof of Lemma 2 (Offset ratios)
From Lemma 1, we observe that the unconstrained-magnitude-maximizing ballots satisfy sgn
Then, by the construction of the magnitude-
, LHS is decreasing in α, and RHS is increasing in α). To keep the difference in signs, we must have
To keep the difference in signs, we must have
As a result, χ R > τ R , χ A < τ A , and χ B < τ B . The third case of equality is obvious.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 8 (2+1, asymmetric district)
The proof is in the three steps: First, we show that for α = 1 2 and τ L 4 7 , both Ties 2 and 3 are relevant, and neither Tie 1 or Tie 4 is relevant. Second, we check the players' best responses. Third, we check for the stability of the equilibrium against small perturbations.
The first step is to prove that only Ties 2 and 3 are relevant pivot ties:
, we are in the upper set where by Lemma 1, the ballots for unconstrained magnitudes satisfy χ A < τ A and χ B < τ B . For α = 1 2 , we have
• Tie 2 is unconstrained:
7 , we are in the upper set for both Ties 2 and 3, and χ A < τ A and χ B < τ B . For α = 1 2 , we have
• Tie 3 is unconstrained:
• Tie 4 is constrained:
• Tie 1 and Tie 4 have equal constrained magnitudes for α = .
• Tie 2 and Tie 3 have equal magnitude for α = • Comparing magnitudes: It remains to compare the constrained magnitude of Tie 1 with the unconstrained magnitude of Tie 2. Comparing magnitudes is extremely difficult, but we can exploit that even the constrained magnitude of Tie 2 is higher that the constrained magnitude of Tie 1. Namely, a constrained magnitude of Tie 2 is 7 to obtain a true inequality of 1 < 2 27 7 35 . Using that LHS is decreasing in τ L , the inequality holds also for any τ L > The second step is to verify the voters' best responses. Recall that in our strategy profile, candidate L 1 is not serious, and only the three candidates L 0 , R 0 , R 1 are serious candidates. Pivotal events are ballot-specific since using only a positive vote differently affects a near-tie than using both a positive and negative vote. We denote pivots for a sincere ballot without prime and pivots for a strategic ballot with prime. We define pivots only for Ties 2 and 3. For R-voter and Tie 2, • For R-voter, a sincere ballot clearly weakly dominates any other ballot since it supports the two most preferred serious candidates R 0 , R 1 • The indifference of L-voter is possible because strategic ballot is more valuable in Tie 2, but sincere ballot is more valuable in Tie 3, and both ties have an equal magnitude. To make L-voter exactly indifferent for any sufficiently large n, we have to have
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• It is valuable now to see that Pr(piv ′ • We seek a sequence of profiles τ n where each is characterized by an increment ε n (lim n→∞ ε n = 0) whereby τ L 2 + ε n and τ L 2 − ε n are the expected vote shares of sincere and strategic L-votes for each n. Intuitively, for each finite Poisson game with the expected number of voters n, the gradually decreasing increment makes L-voter exactly indifferent between a strategic and sincere ballot. From the indifference, we clearly see that the expected score of R 1 must be slightly larger than the expected score of R 0 , thus ε n > 0.
• By offset theorem (Myerson, 2000) , we have that for any event (χ A , χ B , χ C ), the sensitivity of the probability of the event under profile (n(
Consider now the close race S R 1 = S L 0 + 2 S R 0 , which L-voter can change from a tie to a win by a strategic vote. Following Myerson (2002), we exploit in the limit of our equilibria, all probability of this event becomes concentrated, where the strategic votes disappear, and the offset ratios are Similarly, consider the close race S R 0 = S L 0 + 2 S R 1 , which L-voter can change from a tie to a win by a sincere vote. In the limit of our equilibria, all probability of this event becomes concentrated, where the sincere votes disappear, and the offset ratios are ∂ log Pr(S R 0 = S L 0 + 2 S R 1 |nτ n ) ∂ ε n = −n.
• We now put the indifference equation into logarithm, and seek log Pr(S R 1 = S L 0 + 2 S R 0 |nτ n )−log Pr(S R 0 = S L 0 +2 S R 1 |nτ n = log Finally, we see that for τ L > 4 7 , the equilibrium is stable.
• By Lemma 2, if α = An increase in α increases the difference (1+α)τ L − χ A −2χ B while leaving the difference 2χ C − 2(1 − τ L ) unchanged. This means that with an increase in α, the probability mass for the pivot decreases, and the pivot has a lower magnitude.
• Similarly, in the upper set of Tie 3, the respective unconstrained magnitude mag (piv * L 0 /R 0 ) behaves in the following way: In an upper set,
An increase in α decreases the difference (2−α)τ L − χ A −2χ B while leaving the difference 2χ C − 2(1 − τ L ) unchanged. This means that with an increase in α, the probability mass for the pivotal event increases, and the pivot must have a higher magnitude.
• Consider a small deviation ε > 0. For α = We now turn to the symmetric profiles of CAV, where v L = (1, 1, −1, −1). L-voter's gains for each event are identical, only the triple vote is (1, 1, 1, −1) , the sincere vote is (1, 1, −1, −1) , and the quality vote is (1, −1, 1, −1) . It is easy to see that any other ballot that does not use all negative votes is dominated by a ballot that uses all negative votes; hence, the sincere ballot (1, 1, −1, −1) is a unique best response. The profile is not an equilibrium either.
